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Working Paper

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ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes migration streams within and out of the former USSR, here called Eastern Europe. It also discusses potential streams during the coming decades. The main part of the paper, however, is descriptive and builds on information from census data.

A short historical part of the paper gives a background for the discussion on the character and form of present and future migration flows. A simple dynamic model of economic growth in two parts of Europe (Eastern and Northern/Western) show that the present welfare gap will continue to exist, even with a large capital transfer to Eastern Europe. A potential for large migration flows westward will thus be present even during the coming decades.

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POVERTY, ETHNICITY AND MIGRATION POTENTIALS IN EASTERN EUROPE

Sture Öberg¹ and Helena Boubnova²

Geopolitical changes in Europe make it important to apply theories from both economic and social geography in order to prepare for future consequences of a new political order. Here we will apply them on migration from Eastern Europe, which here means the former USSR or Russian Empire, to other parts of Europe and on migration between nations or republics in Eastern Europe.

A free mobility in Europe of production factors like capital and labor would, according to economic theory, lead to capital moving east and people migrating west. The potential strength of these flows and how they are encouraged or opposed by important actors is one aim of this paper. The other is to understand the ongoing restructuring of the population within Eastern Europe with special attention on the prospective homogenization between ethnic and territorial distribution of nationalities. How could increased freedom in the political system affect migration? Both voluntary and forced migration have already increased and future mass migration flows might emerge.

There is no way that science can be used to make a prognosis on future international migration flows. Migration flows between countries are regulated but rules change, and sometimes the streams cannot be controlled by rules. Many actors are involved in the emergence of the new geopolitical map of Europe, and even with a deterministic approach--which we do not have--it would be impossible to estimate a model of the complex dynamic system affecting international migration.

This paper will therefore not try to estimate future migration streams within or out of Eastern Europe but discuss the potential streams that could occur during some scenarios of political and economic change. The main part of the paper will, however, be descriptive and build on information from USSR census data. For a specialist on Soviet population geography there will be very few additions to existing knowledge on empirical data. The only so far unpublished data (as this paper is written in 1991) will be on contemporary emigration. Also the discussion on future migration streams is to be seen as a first attempt to find reasonable figures on reasonable scenarios, not an effort to make a prognosis.

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1. BACKGROUND, DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES

Three out of ten Europeans live in the European part³ of the former USSR. These around 200 million inhabitants in "Eastern Europe" belong to a large number of ethnic groups having their own history and languages (see Figure 1). It is of course not easy to define a language, but officially 70 languages are spoken in Eastern Europe. Newspapers are published in 50 (!) languages. The religious split is less dramatic than the linguistic. The Russian Orthodox Church dominates this part of Europe but substantial minorities are Muslim, Roman Catholic or Protestant. Officially four different alphabets (Russian/Cyrillic, Latin, Georgian and Armenian) are used in this motley crowd of populations. Today there are 17 "nationalities" (ethnic groups with the official status of nationality) in Eastern Europe that have more than a million members.



Figure 1. Main geographical areas in Europe, 1992. The terms used are based on the cardinal points. In the literature there is confusion about most of these terms and some of them are by tradition very "political".

As we all know, there have always been tensions and sometimes open wars between the different nationalities in Eastern Europe. Since the Middle Ages, the Russians have dominated both politically and culturally. Especially since the 16th century their influence has been spreading. Today, around 15 million Russians live in non-Russian parts of Eastern Europe. Their "historical rights" to live outside Russia are being discussed and will continue to be so during the coming years and decades. When other large empires lost their power, like the British in India or the Ottoman in the Balkan, a

³Here we will not deal with the more than 90 million inhabitants living in the Asian part of the former USSR. We have included the Caucasus area in the European part of the Union. Praxis differs on this point. Traditionally the Caucasus is geographically outside Europe, although ethnically parts of the Caucasus are typically European. Georgians and Armenians are Semitic Christians, and Azerbaijanis are Semitic Muslims. For practical reasons the whole area is sometimes, as in this chapter, included in Europe.

return migration of the ruling class to their homelands occurred. Will we see the same process now in Eastern Europe?

The Russians form the major ethnic group, about 115 million, in Eastern Europe. They are also the largest ethnic group in Europe as a whole. Other large groups are the 41 million Ukrainians and the 10 million Byelorussians. All three groups are Slavic.

Some groups are classified as foreign because their historic origin is a territory which today is a sovereign nation. They are of course also potential emigrants. The foreigners in Eastern Europe are, for example, Germans, Jews, Poles, Koreans, Turks, Hungarians, Greeks and Rumanians. Ethnicity is officially registered in a passport. Every citizen above the age of 16 must have a passport where the "nationality" (like Russian, German, Jew or Tatar) is registered, irrespective of place of residence. If someone wants to migrate and work in another region, a document from the new employer and the passport must be presented to the local police who then will register the move. When two persons with different ethnic backgrounds (e.g. a Russian and a Georgian) have a child, the child can choose ethnic membership at the age of 16. As we will see later in the paper, these choices change over time depending on the relative status of different nationalities in different parts of Eastern Europe. It also means that a person belonging to the Russian ethnic group (according to the passport) could have 50 percent Jewish "blood". The potential migrant stream to Israel is thus larger than the number of people registered as Jews in Eastern Europe. Also 25 percent Jewish or German "blood" will qualify for immigration visas to Israel or Germany. Also some other relations to a Jewish person or belonging to the Jewish religion will qualify. Later in the paper, we will try to estimate the size of the "foreign" ethnic population in Eastern Europe using different definitions.

Statistical information on ethnic groups in different parts of Eastern Europe can be found in censuses from 1897 (the first census in the Russian Empire), 1926, 1937, 1939, 1959, 1970, 1979, and 1989. We will not use data for the countryside from the 1939 census because of its poor quality.⁴ We have assumed that the quality of the other census data is suitable enough for our purposes. As demographers are aware, in large countries (like the USSR or USA) there is always some uncertainty because people do not live where they are registered, some try to hide, and there are also practical problems in getting the statistics correct. In the censuses, nationality, native language, second language, and place of birth are registered. From 1926, 1937, 1959 and onwards it is possible to map "mixed" individuals whose native language do not coincide with nationality.

Existing statistical sources do not allow a study of migration streams for nationalities. Some indirect information of net migration figures could be obtained from a cohort enumeration in the censuses. The only source for contemporary ethnic flows is from the

⁴Stalin was not happy with the census in 1937, so he ordered a new census which was completed in 1939. However, the latter did not please him either, so very few results were published. In the 1937 data, which is now being published in Moscow, it was possible to see all the losses in the countryside due to hunger or famine after the collectivization efforts (see, e.g., Tolz 1991). Thus he classified the data and sent most of the civil servants who had been working with the census to concentration camps.

last census, 1989, where, as earlier, there was a question on moves during the year before 1988.

The short historical description in the next section is based on common knowledge from historical books published outside Eastern Europe (e.g. White 1990; Encyclopedia Britannica 1973; La Grande Encyclopedie 1976; Meyers Enzyklopädisches Lexikon 1978). Modern Russian books, written before perestroika, give very inaccurate and biased historical overviews.

Mass migration is here used as a more popular word for large migration flows between areas with different cultures or sovereignty. Mass migration is often net-flows that change the spatial distribution of the population. If forty million Europeans (net) migrate to North America, then this is a mass migration. The same is true for more than 200 million Europeans moving from the countryside and an agrarian life to the cities with their urban culture. Also smaller numbers can be regarded as mass migration streams if they comprise large proportions of the population. After the Second World War, 250,000 Finns moved from Karelia to Finland, and during the following decades the same amount (net) moved from Finland to Sweden. Also these streams are here regarded as mass migration.

2. HISTORY

The history of Western and Eastern Europe differ in many respects. Some would argue that differences in physical conditions helped to create specific conditions in the two parts of Europe. In Eastern Europe, endless plains, low population density and lack of easy communication to other cultures first created many ethnic groups and then made it possible for one of them to dominate the whole area. The rivalry between Christian and Muslim groups in border areas also made it easier for the dominating Russian group to get support; otherwise, the alternative would have been domination by a power with a totally different religion.

Others would argue that deep cultural differences made the lifestyle very different in Eastern Europe compared with the rest of Europe. Irrespective of the causes behind history we can describe some of the differences.

For more than half of this century the political ideologies have differed, with state capitalism in the East--often labelled as people democracies--and with democracies in the West--often labelled as capitalistic societies. In the USSR, state planning was an ideology, or vice versa, the ideology was a complicated planning system, which first suppressed market behavior during the Stalin Era and later created corruption. However, the ideology did not work out to be efficient. In the West, the states built more physical and social infrastructures for their inhabitants, but this was never recognized in the political language as state planning. The different political systems resulted in both economic and human development in the West and in a stagnation of these aspects of life in the East. We will come back to the differences in welfare and standard as a cause for potential outmigration from the former USSR. In this section we will shortly run

through the history of Eastern Europe with special attention to changes in the demographic composition of the population.

Building the Empire

Around the year 1000, the so-called Kiev-nation controlled an area from the Baltic almost to the Black Sea. Some hundred years later, the Mongols controlled large parts of this area. This Asian period lasted until 1480. The first Russian czar, Ivan IV who was crowned in 1547, conquered Tatar nations and expanded the territory to the Caspian Sea. He also began colonization in Siberia: parts of the Ukraine were included into Russia in the middle of the 17th century; areas along the Baltic coast, like Estonia in 1721; large areas along the Black Sea later during the 18th century, including Crimea in 1783; large parts of Poland before 1800; Finland in 1809; and the remainder of Poland in 1830. All the time new areas were included in Asia. A large powerful empire was created. Many ethnic groups were politically but not socially united.

The physical expansion of the empire came to a halt around one hundred years ago: in southern Europe, in the Balkan, by the Berlin Congress in 1878; along the North American coast in 1867, when Alaska was sold to the USA; and in eastern Asia when Japan in 1904-1905 forced Russian troops to leave Manchuria.

The Empire became weaker during the beginning of this century and was not successful during the First World War. As we all know the czar was overthrown in 1917 and Lenin became the new leader. Several "white" generals with support from Western European countries and the USA tried to fight the communists, but they were defeated after some years of civil war. The USSR, the new empire, was formally created in 1922. The size of the new union was smaller in Europe than the old Russian Empire, and areas like Finland and the Baltic states became independent and sovereign nations.

During its history, Russia has taken measures to encourage migration. Like other "peripheral" countries, it needed technology and human skills to build its strength. In 1763, Katherine the Second wrote an edict "About permission for all foreigners to settle where they want to live". Immigrants received privileges like tax release during the first ten years and freedom of confession. They were also spared from military service. This migration policy led to large immigration flows. In total, more than four million foreigners lived in Russia one and a half centuries later. The largest group were the Germans, with more than two million. The assimilation of foreigners during the last century (and even later) was slow, partly because they were prohibited to marry a person from another ethnic group with a different religion without converting.

During the last part of the 19th century, small groups of East Europeans started to migrate to North America (Janovskij 1909). In 1870 less than one percent of the immigrants to the USA was from Eastern Europe. These immigrants were important because they transferred information of a rich land with political freedom back to the mother country and thus prepared the way for future large migration streams. After the turn of the century every fifth immigrant to the USA was East European. The large immigration waves thus came in the beginning of the 20th century; the numbers are shown in Figure 2. The ethnic composition of the immigrants from Eastern Europe is

interesting: only one out of twenty was Russian; nearly every second was a Jew (see Figure 2). The estimated proportion of returning migrants was usually very low, but there is one ethnic group where it was very high: around 30-40 percent (in 1908-1911 it was 37 percent) of the Russians moved back to Eastern Europe (Patkanov 1911).




Figure 2. Ethnic composition of migrants from Russia to the USA, 1900-1913.

Probably the main reason for the ethnic composition of the immigrants is that Russia changed its migration policy during the last years of the 19th century and encouraged outmigration from Russia of non-Russians (Obolenskij 1928). At the same time, Russians were encouraged to migrate within the Empire, preferably to border regions and Siberia. Non-orthodox groups, like the Poles or Jews, were not treated like the Russians. For example, only Orthodox Christians were given land for farming in Kazakhstan and Siberia.

A new emigration wave from Russia took place during the civil war. Between two and three million left the country and moved to France, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Turkey and China. As of 1926 emigration was not allowed.

In the Old Empire another interesting process took place: temporary and seasonal migration across the border areas. For example the population on both sides of the Russian-German border were Polish. There was a shortage of rural workers and higher salaries on the German side of the border. Illegal border crossing for work in Germany became more and more popular, and it was later accepted as legal if the workers moved back to Russia during the winter.

Within Russia people were often stimulated to move. Originally non-Orthodox Christians and also unaccepted reformist-Orthodox, often moved to border areas. Also many conventional Orthodox Christians continued this process, including to areas in Kazakhstan or Siberia, where they received land and release from taxes if they contributed to the defence of the territory. One probable idea was to get a Slavic majority in all parts of the Empire. This policy was successful except in the Baltic and Polish districts, where only around one-tenth of the population was Russian Orthodox according to the 1897 census (see Appendix Tables A1 and A2). Also in the Caucasus, the proportion of Russians was low. Another resettlement wave occurred from crowded areas in Middle Russia to virgin land east of Moscow.

The Stalin Era

Stalin, or Josef Vissarionovich Dsjugasjvili, born in Georgia in 1879, succeeded Lenin in the beginning of the 1920s and secured a personal powerful position in the USSR. Some years later he became an absolute ruler with total control over life and death in the whole empire until his death in 1953. He had a well-known interest in ethnic questions following his position in 1917 as a commissary for nationalities. Some of the ethnic structural changes during his regime are due to his personal will.

One of his early decisions was to transfer control over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, inhabited by Armenians, to Azerbaijan and also to create a buffer strip of land that would separate the region from the Armenian Republic. The historical background to this decision is said to have been quite complicated but the resulting conflicts have become very violent during the last years. Most Armenians are Christians; most Azerbaijanis are Muslims and speak a Turkic language. Many Armenians see them as successors of the Turks who were responsible for genocidal attacks on Armenians in 1915.

Stalin expanded the physical borders of the Empire substantially during the Second World War both in Asia and Europe. The borders of the old Russian Empire were restored again. In Europe he occupied Eastern Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1939 and kept these areas after the war in 1945. He also conquered around ten percent of the Finnish territory. After the war Byelorussia and Lithuania were expanded westward. The Ukraine was also expanded by incorporation of Polish, Czechoslovak and Hungarian areas. Kaliningrad (former Königsberg) was taken from the Germans, and finally Moldavia, a part of Rumania since the Russian civil war, was again made part of the USSR. The new Soviet Union after the war was even somewhat larger than the old Empire, consisting of ten republics in the European part of the union: three Baltic, three Slavic, Moldavia and three Caucasian republics (see Figure 3). It is this area which here is called Eastern Europe. Outside the Union he created a border district with depending nations, from Finland in the north over Poland, the former GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania to Bulgaria in the southeast.




Figure 3. The European part of the USSR (1923-1992) consists of ten republics since the Second World War (1945).

During the Stalin Era, the Union was industrialized and urbanized. Urbanization could be said to be the largest global mass migration phenomenon of this century. A large part of the world's population changed both type of settlement and life style. Often urbanization is a local or intraregional process, but in Eastern Europe it has, to some extent, also been interregional. Many rural groups during the Stalin Era were sent or moved to cities in Siberia. The urbanization during the Stalin Era was however not as rapid as it became during the 1960s and 1970s (see Table 1 and Figure 4). One reason for this was that the population living outside cities did not have passports and therefore could not move without prior permission. When Stalin came to power, two out of ten inhabitants in Eastern Europe lived in cities, and when he died the figure was five out of ten. At present there are 18 cities in the European part of the USSR, with 1 million inhabitants or more, and 20 cities with 0.5-1.0 million inhabitants.

Table 1. Population (in thousands) in major cities in the European part of the USSR in 1939, 1959 and 1989. The location of the cities is shown in Figure 4.

		1939	1959	1989
1	Moscow	4,183	5,046	8,800
2	St. Petersburg	3,385	3,321	4,948
3	Kiev	847	1,104	2,544
4	Baku	755	971	1,741
5	Kharkov	833	934	1,587
6	Minsk	237	509	1,543
7	Nizhni Novgorod	644	942	1,425
8	Samara	390	806	1,280
9	Odessa	602	667	1,141
10	Dnepropetrovsk	527	660	1,182
11	Tbilisi	519	695	1,194
12	Yerevan	204	509	1,168
13	Ufa	258	547	1,092
14	Donetsk	466	700	1,090
15	Kazan	398	647	1,068
16	Perm	306	629	1,075
17	Rostov-on-Don	510	600	1,004
18	Volgograd	445	592	988



Figure 4. Major cities in Eastern Europe (the former European part of the USSR).

The movement of ethnic groups in Europe at the end of the Second World War was substantial. The usual figure tells us that 25 million Europeans changed national location just after the war. Half of them moved to non-communist countries, especially West Germany. All of these movements made it possible for Poles and others to occupy "empty" territory and capital. People from the Baltic states fled to Sweden and other western countries. Many were moved because national borders changed, e.g. Poland got some of the German territory in compensation for some of its eastern territory which was transformed into USSR-territory. During and after the war Russians were moving into new territories in the Empire: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kaliningrad, and Poland. Many former Jewish places in Eastern Poland and the Ukraine were empty since all inhabitants had been killed by the Germans; they now became Russian. Several ethnic groups were moved from their home countries into Russia. Stalin wanted more people in Kazakhstan so he moved Germans from Volga and Tatars from Crimea to colonize new areas in the east. He also wanted more people in Siberia so he prolonged his earlier policy to have large concentration camps there for unwanted groups.

As mentioned above, urbanization was the largest resettlement process during the Stalin Era. As indicated earlier, involuntary settlement in new areas, most often outside Europe and often in concentration camps, was also a sizable part of this process. The numbers involved in this sad part of the Soviet history are discussed. A crude Russian estimate is 30 million totally resettled, including the 12 million that were killed or died in the camps. This figure could be low; figures twice as large are also mentioned (e.g. by Soljenitsyn). Of all Eastern Europeans born between 1880 and 1920, five to ten percent belonged to the group of forced migrants.

One could say that during the Stalin Era, there were two categories of forced migrants. First, the non-conformists, e.g. people with the wrong attitude toward communist ideas like the farmers who did not like collectivization of land in 1929 and people belonging to the wrong social class, group or socialist party (1922 and onwards). The same groups were later forced to move from the Baltic states, Eastern Poland, Western Ukraine and Moldavia (1939 and onwards). Other groups that had to move to concentration camps were collected in areas that had been occupied by the Germans during the Second World War. Also Soviet soldiers from German prison camps were transferred to Soviet camps, mainly in Siberia.

The second category of forced migrants had to move because of ethnicity. Non-Russians like Crimea-Tatars and Greeks were moved from Crimea to Middle Asia. Around ten of the Caucasian nationalities were moved from Caucasus to Middle Asia. As already mentioned, Germans from Middle Volga had to settle in Middle Asia, Siberia and Kazakhstan.

Emigration during the Stalin Era was regulated by an edict from 1926: it was not allowed and there were only a few exceptions (Raëff 1990). Immigration was allowed, but very few people moved into the USSR during this period, and those who did were mainly intellectuals from other parts of Europe. However Stalin did not trust them, and he usually had them killed.

From Spring to Perestroika

A few years after his death, Stalin was criticized as being inhuman, and a period of less repression started. The half of the population living in the countryside were given passports which increased their geographical mobility. There was no expansion of the Soviet territory, but military efforts were made both to control border areas (Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, and border fighting with China during 1969) and to support newly emerging allies (e.g. the Cuba incident in 1962 or the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979).

We have access to three censuses from the "spring period" of 1959, 1970 and 1979, and one census from the early perestroika period of 1989. Some basic data for the republics in 1989 are shown in Table 2. The restructuring forces during this period were substantial. One of the many well-known migration streams consisted of young Russians and Ukrainians moving to Kazakhstan. Instead of modernizing the countryside--including the agriculture--in Russia and the Ukraine, the communist party invested large amounts of resources to develop new farm land in, e.g., Kazakhstan. Today this has contributed to the well-known problem in the old countryside: poor living conditions and an aging population.

Table 2. Inhabitants, population density and share of non-nationals in Eastern Europe in 1989.

	Population, 1989, in millions	Population density, average distance* in meters	Share of non- nationals, 1989, in percent
Russia	147.0	232	19
Ukraine	51.5	119	27
Byelorussia	10.2	157	22
Moldavia	4.3	97	36
Estonia	1.6	164	39
Latvia	2.7	138	48
Lithuania	3.7	137	20
Georgia	5.4	125	30
Armenia	3.3	105	7
Azerbaijan	7.0	122	17

* The number of inhabitants/km² is not a very useful figure because we do not know from our everyday experience how big a square kilometer actually is. Average distance, *ad*, is defined as the average distance between individuals if the whole population in a region is equally distributed over the whole area. In the whole of the USSR, *ad* is around 300 meters, in the UK it is 70 meters, in Germany 73 meters and in France 107 meters.

A summary of how the balance between different ethnic groups have changed during 1959-1989 is shown in Table 3. The data are from the whole USSR, including the Asian part, but only nationalities with more than 100,000 members in Europe in 1959 are included. The groups are ranked according to their rate of change. Five groups have decreased--the number of Jews by as much as 36 percent. All of the 26 other groups have increased. Five of them have doubled during the three decades--the Gypsies, Kabardinians, Azerbaijanis, Chechens and Dagestanis.

Table 3. Nationalities in Eastern Europe, their numbers in 1989, and the rate of change, percent, since 1959.

Nationality*	Population in thousands, 1989	Population change 1959-1989 in percent
Jews	1,449	-36
Finns	67	-28
Karelians	131	-22
Poles	1,126	-18
Mordvinians	1,154	-11
Estonians	1,027	+4
Latvians	1,459	+4
Hungarians	171	+10
Bulgarians	373	+15
Greeks	358	+16
Ukrainians	44,186	+19
Udmurts	748	+20
Chuvash	1,842	+25
Germans	2,039	+26
Byelorussians	10,036	+27
Russians	145,155	+27
Lithuanians	3,067	+32
Tatars	6,489	+32
Rumanians	146	+38
Koreans	439	+40
Ossetians	598	+46
Bashkirs	1,449	+47
Georgians	3,981	+48
Moldavians	3,352	+51
Gagaus	198	+60
Armenians	4,623	+66
Kabardinians	391	+92
Gypsies	262	+99
Dagestanis	2,065	+118
Chechens	957	+128
Azerbaijanis	6,770	+130

* Some figures measure the numbers in the whole of the USSR, including the Asian part. The table includes all nationalities having more than 100,000 members in 1959. The "new" larger groups not included in the table are the Turks (208,000 in 1989) and the Kurds (152,000 in 1989).

Larger areas with majorities from a specific ethnic group are shown in Figure 5. Here some smaller groups of less than 100,000 members are visible.



Figure 5. Ethnic composition in a part of Eastern Europe.

From Perestroika to Sovereign Nations

While writing this paper, several of the former republics of the USSR have become nations of their own. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were recognized as sovereign nations by both the USSR State Council in Moscow and by the European Community in Brussels in September 1991. Three months later, eleven Soviet republics signed up as founders of the Commonwealth of Independent States. A new union was created. The old, the USSR, voted itself out of existence on December 26, 1991. The degree of independence among the independent states will take several years to sort out.

Restructuring Forces 1959-1989

Within a given territory, three factors can change the ethnic composition of a population: natural increase in different ethnic groups (number of births minus number of deaths), net migration of members in the ethnic groups (number of immigrants minus number of

emigrants) and assimilation between groups (reclassification of membership or biased classification of children in mixed marriages).

Natural increase is usually the most important factor of change for large ethnic groups. Russians have fewer babies than most other ethnic groups, and as we know, any difference in fertility will, in the long run, change the power structure between ethnic groups. In some of the areas where large numbers of Russians have moved and become the majority, the situation has now changed because of different reproduction rates. One example of a surviving minority that already has formed a majority is the Tatars in one of the regions in the Middle Volga.

A study of the level of reproduction in the ten republics, using cohort data for women born between 1935 and 1955, show that on average, women in Russia, the Ukraine, Estonia and Latvia have had fewer children (10-20%) than the reproduction rate (2.1 per woman). Close to reproduction rate but not above are women born in Byelorussia and Lithuania. Some natural population increase (2.2 to 2.6) was true for Moldavia and Georgia, and a little more for Armenia. Large increases took place in Azerbaijan, where Muslim women had many children. However, during this period of two decades, the average number decreased substantially in Azerbaijan from 4.4 to 2.6 children per woman (Boubnova, 1989). The present and expected future population increases in Muslim areas are thus mainly due to the population structure. Many inhabitants are in age groups where they form families and have children.

Migration streams changed radically during the last years of the old regime. Before 1988 there were no data on ethnic migration, but through indirect methods it is possible to make inference from spatial distribution data. One such source is a data base on cohorts every tenth year. Here, however, we will use the census data from 1979 and 1989, including the information on migration during 1988, which is available in the 1989 census.

The first break in the old migration pattern shows that Russians return to Russia. Before, the Russians were moving to all parts of the USSR but during the last decade the opposite occurred: they returned from the Central Asian republics and from Kazakhstan. This movement increased during the last years before 1989 when nationalism grew in strength (see Appendix Table A3). The clear tendency became: Russians go home. In the Caucasus their numbers were reduced between 1979 and 1989 by 9 percent in Georgia, 27 percent in Armenia and 18 percent in Azerbaijan.

The second variation is that Slavic people in general seem to stop their geographic expansion. Earlier also Ukrainians and Byelorussians were moving to other republics. Some examples from the decade 1979-1989 show that the number of Ukrainians increased by 34-39 percent in the Baltic republics, by 22 percent in Azerbaijan and by 35 percent in Uzbekistan (see Appendix Table A4). For the USSR as a whole their numbers only increased by 4 percent. While Byelorussians increased 6 percent in the union, their numbers in Central Asia, Georgia and Azerbaijan increased by 50 percent. However during the last year of the period, in 1989, both Ukrainians and Byelorussians were moving back to their "homelands".

The third deviation shows that the increasing strength of the Slavic population in the Baltic republics was coming to an end even before they became sovereign states. At least there were efforts made to restrict immigration. Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians were no longer welcome to settle there. The pull-factor in the Baltic areas is evident: a higher standard of living. In spite of a long tradition, around two centuries, of Russian supremacy over the areas, only one out of five inhabitants was "non-Baltic" when the USSR took control during the Second World War. After the war some Balts fled to the West, others were killed or moved eastward by Stalin and a russification process began, especially in the two northern Baltic states. It continued after the Stalin Era. Economic factors made it tempting for Slavs to move to Latvia and Estonia. The 1989 census shows that in one (Latvia) or two (Estonia) decades the native groups would probably have become minorities in Slavic countries. This is one of many examples showing how geopolitical changes include both political change and consequences for the population geography.

International migration is easier to control than internal migration. Outmigration from the USSR was nearly non-existent before perestroika.⁵ Between 1987 and 1990 the flows to non-USSR countries from the European part of the union have doubled every year (see Table 4). Also other short term flows of people working temporarily outside the union started when this possibility was allowed in 1987.

Table 4. Migration flows from Eastern Europe to countries outside the USSR, 1987-1990, in thousands.

Origin Republic in Eastern Europe	1987	1988	1989	1990
Russia	9	21	48	104
Ukraine	7	18	50	95
Byelorussia	1	3	15	34
Moldavia	2	2	7	21
Estonia	1	2	2	1
Latvia	1	1	3	5
Lithuania	1	1	2	4
Georgia	1	1	3	6
Armenia	6	16	12	5
Azerbaijan	0	1	3	12

The permanent outmigrants are usually Jews (Sabatello 1992) or Germans (Wendt 1991). Statistics for the destination of USSR immigrants (not only the European part) from 1976 to 1990 (see Table 5) show that nine out of ten immigrants are Jewish or German, or at least have a close family relation⁶ to one of these groups.

⁵The exceptions were mainly Jews. On average, nearly 25,000 per year were allowed to leave the union between 1976-1986. This corresponds to one person among 10,000 inhabitants in Eastern Europe per year.

⁶It was only possible for non-Jews to get a Jewish registration in the passport if they used illegal methods.

Table 5. Destination of USSR⁷ emigrants, 1976-1990, percent and thousands.

Destination	1976-80	1981-85	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Israel	62	31	15	26	28	45	59
Germany	18	18	13	40	48	42	31
USA	7	3	6	16	17	6	2
Greece	1	2	6	3	5	6	5
Other	12	55	39	15	3	1	2
Sum (%)	100	99	99	100	101	100	99
In thousands	216	46	7	40	109	236	454

Over the generations, cohabiting ethnic groups mix biologically and culturally. Small and geographically-spread groups usually disappear if they do not work hard to maintain their cultural identity. Assimilation processes in Eastern Europe today take place partly through intermarriages between groups. Some data on assimilation are presented in Appendix Tables A5, A6 and A7. Statistics on these assimilation processes are published for Jews, Germans and Poles. Indirectly through statistics on nationality and mother tongue, some conclusions can be made on assimilation among other groups.

Statistics show that in 1988 only one-third (31%) of the Jews married another Jew in Russia. The corresponding proportion in the Ukraine and Byelorussia were around every second Jew (50% and 56%). In "mixed" families it was common to give the children a non-Jewish nationality. The proportion of children in mixed Jewish families choosing a Russian, Ukrainian or Byelorussian nationality in 1989 were 95%, 94% and 93%, respectively. It is thus clear that large groups of Jews were assimilating into the Soviet society before the opportunities to migrate to Israel opened up. This could be explained in many ways: some feel more like Russians, for example, than like Jews; others prefer to be registered as Russians in the hope of gaining privileges or to avoid being on probation.

Among German mixed marriages in Russia, a minority of the children (6 percent) choose German nationality in their passports. In Kazakhstan, where there are more Germans than in Russia, 24 percent of the children of mixed marriages choose German nationality. On average, Germans are much less assimilated than Jews, especially in the countryside. In the four republics or nations close to Poland, one out of five children born to Poles in mixed marriages choose Polish nationality.

Statistics on mother tongue could also say something on how different groups have assimilated. They will also show that large groups of people are classified in a way which has more to do with "blood" and classification of earlier generations than the actual

⁷These data are from the whole USSR. Around one-third of the immigrants, mainly Germans but some Armenians and Jews, are from Middle Asia. These figures show more Jews migrating to Israel than in reality. This was a way to hide the fact that Jews were allowed to migrate to the USA. For the year 1990, the 59% refers to permissions to emigrate. The actual percentage of emigrants to Israel that year was 46.

culture to which they belong. In 1989, the share of people with another native language than their own, according to nationality were for some groups (percentages are in parentheses): Hungarians (6), Turks (9), Kurds (19), Rumanians (39), Koreans (50), Germans (52), Poles (69) and Jews (87). A large majority of the Jews did not use Yiddish in their homes. Every second person classified as German no longer used the German language at home.

3. CHARACTER AND FORM OF PRESENT AND FUTURE MIGRATION

Lately there has been a large interest in present and especially expected future migration within and out of the former USSR (e.g. Grecic 1991). This section will first deal with potential ethnic migration within Eastern Europe and from Eastern Europe to other parts of the world, and then discuss future economic migration within and especially out of Eastern Europe.


Eastern Europe Today

As indicated earlier, in all parts of the former USSR there are now strong forces working for national or regional sovereignty. This could be the beginning of a more fundamental regionalization of the administrative power structure in Eastern Europe. In other parts of Europe, like Spain, former Yugoslavia and the Czech and Slovak Republics, this tendency of ethnic control over "homelands" is evident. In Eastern Europe there are enough Tatars, Chuvash, Chechens, Bashkirs and Moldavians to form small nations of their own like majority groups did in the new Baltic states. Also smaller groups could form nations or autonomous regions within federal states.

For example, in the Russian part of the northern Caucasus we find Slavic Russians and Ukrainians, Caucasus groups, Turks, Armenians and smaller groups of Greeks, Jews, Kurds, and Assyrians. Just to give an insight to the ethnic problems that could emerge, we present a short overview of the nationalities living in this area. In one autonomous republic, Dagestan, people from more than 30 nationalities, including Avars (500,000), Dargins (400,000), Lesgians (300,000) and Kumuks (300,000), belong to the 1.8 million population. In another autonomous republic, South Ossetia, we find Ossetians, who are mainly Orthodox but also Muslims. Checheno-Ingush, another republic, is mainly inhabited by Muslims (Synnit), Chechens and Ingush. The ethnic tension in this republic is large. The autonomous republic of Kabardino-Balkar and the autonomous region of Karachayevo-Cherkess are formed by two nationalities, Karachayevs (140,000) and Balkars (78,000), but they have the same language and are quite alike culturally. The same is true for the Circassians (500,000) and the Kabardinians (400,000), two groups living in separate settlements with different autonomies. Among other small groups are the Assyrians (26,000), who like several other groups have an interesting historical background: they are the successors of the powerful ancient Assyrians. Among "foreign" nationalities in the area we find Greeks, Kurds and Turks.

The potential ethnic conflicts are numerous here (see Figure 6) as well as in many other areas in Eastern Europe. There are no good statistics on ethnic social unrest, violence, civil war, etc., but we know that a state close to civil war is evident in areas like the

Figure 6. Areas with ethnic and territorial conflicts in 1989-1991 in Caucasus, a border region between Europe and Asia. Source: Moscow News.



above-mentioned South Ossetia in Georgia or Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. We also know that ethnic groups often dislike each other.

There is a new problem which is an important indicator of ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe: the appearance of large numbers of refugees. The official number in 1988-1990 was 600,000, as registered by the State Committee on Labor, Ministry of Internal Affairs, KGB and the Defence Ministry. This figure accounts for 420,000 refugees from Armenia and Azerbaijan, 70,000 refugees (mainly Turks) from Uzbekistan, 9,000 Caucasians from Kazakhstan, and 75,000 Russian-speakers (often military personnel with families) plus 25,000 other refugees from Baku. An unofficial estimate is one million refugees,⁸ including more Turks from Uzbekistan, Russians returning from Tajikistan, Kirghizia and Tuva, and some Russian-speaking groups from Azerbaijan and the Baltic republics.

Potential Ethnic Migration Within Eastern Europe

A rough estimate of potential ethnic problems could be based on the actual geographical distribution of minorities in Eastern Europe (see Table 6). An increase in Russian nationalism would make life harder for all minorities in Russia. Some of them, like the Baltic groups, have already net-migrated from Russia to their homelands. Others, like the Tatars, also have an autonomous republic where they dominate in numbers and therefore have some sort of homeland. Still others, like the Germans, are emigrating and current ideas of an autonomous German republic will probably not stop the out-migration of ethnic Germans.

On the other hand, anti-Russian feelings in areas outside Russia could, depending on their strength, force Russians to "return home". A majority of the three million Russians in non-Slavic European nations, including 1.7 million in the Baltic and 0.8 million in the Caucasus, could move back to their mother country in the same manner as the Turks left the Balkan, when the Ottoman Empire collapsed one hundred years ago.

Anti-Muslim feelings are present in Russia, Georgia and Armenia as well as in other parts of Europe, and future conflicts including civil wars with large numbers of refugees are always a threat.

⁸The figure also includes some 120,000-150,000 environmental refugees who had to leave the Chernobyl zone; they are not of direct interest in this chapter where we deal with ethnic and economic refugees.

Table 6. Minorities in Eastern Europe (former European part of the USSR) in 1989, in thousands.

Republics: Minorities	Rus 1	Ukr 2	Bye 3	Mol 4	Est 5	Lat 6	Lit 7	Geo 8	Arm 9	Aze 10
1 Russians	* 11,356	1,342	562	475	906	344	341	52	392	
2 Ukrainians	4,363	*	291	600	48	92	45	52	8	32
3 Byelorussians	1,206	440	*	20	28	120	63	9	1	8
4 Moldavians	173	325	5	*	1	3	1	3	1	2
5 Estonians	46	4	1	-	*	3	1	2	0	0
6 Latvians	47	7	3	-	3	*	4	1	0	0
7 Lithuanians	70	11	8	1	3	35	*	1	0	1
8 Georgians	131	24	3	1	1	1	1	*	1	14
9 Armenians	532	54	5	3	2	3	2	44	*	391
10 Azerbaijanis	336	37	5	3	1	2	1	301	85	*
Tatars	5,522	87	12	3	4	5	5	4	0	28
Chuvash	1,774	20	3	1	1	2	1	1	0	1
Bashkirs	1,345	7	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1
Mordvinians	1,073	19	3	1	1	1	0	0	0	1
Germans	842	38	4	7	3	4	2	2	0	1
Jews	537	486	112	66	5	23	12	24	1	31
Poles	95	219	418	5	3	60	258	2	0	1
Majority group (in millions)	119	38	8	3	1	1	3	4	3	6

* The figure for the majority group is shown on the last line.

Potential Ethnic Migration from Eastern Europe

Ethnic tension will also affect outmigration from nations of the former USSR (Öberg and Springfieldt 1991). For example anti-Jewish feelings, which exist in Eastern Europe, is one of the causes behind the migration of the Jewish population to Israel or another Western country. There are 1.4 million Jews in Eastern Europe and still another 0.1 million (in 1989) in the Asian part of the former USSR. And as discussed above, if a Jew marries a non-Jew (which is true for every second Jew), and if they have two children, then three more persons are allowed to emigrate, according to the present migration rules. The high rate of intermix between Jews and Slavs would, after a few generations, assimilate nearly all Jews. Now it is more probable that mixed couples and Slavic children of mixed couples will use the legal opportunity to emigrate. The possible number of persons wanting to move to Israel in the future could be anywhere from a low number to between two and three million. The unknown size of future outmigration is illustrated in Figure 7.

Other actual and potential emigration groups to other parts of Europe are the Germans, Poles and Greeks. While the Germans in Asia (Kazakhstan, 1 million) have been less assimilated, the Germans in Russia (0.8 million) have had the same rate of assimilation

with the Slavs as the Jews. A multiplier of two to three has to be applied to estimate the number of potential German emigrants.




Figure 7. The potential ethnic migration from Eastern Europe involves Jews, Germans and other groups.

Not only groups with a "mother nation" outside Eastern Europe are probable ethnic migrants, but also groups with many relatives in other countries may migrate more easily. Statistics produced in the USSR (see Table 7) show how many relatives the main nationalities have in other countries. Russians in other countries, e.g. France and the USA, emigrated so long ago that their relations to former relatives in Russia are probably weak. The Ukrainians and especially the Balts emigrated only one or two generations ago and thus they probably have stronger relations. Armenians are another group with large proportions in welfare states outside Eastern Europe: ten percent of all Armenians live in the USA and four percent live in France. Azerbaijanis outside the former USSR are mainly neighbors living in Irak.

Table 7. Number of "relatives" to main nationalities in Eastern Europe living outside the USSR in 1987.

Russians	1,700,000
Ukrainians	1,300,000
Estonians	80,000
Latvians	70,000
Lithuanians	350,000
Georgians	120,000
Armenians	1,300,000
Azerbaijanis	7,700,000

Note: These statistics are based on census data from other countries, e.g. the USA. Byelorussians are not registered as an ethnic group or a nationality outside the USSR and thus there are no figures. Approximately one percent of the Byelorussians live outside the USSR. Moldavians are registered as Rumanians outside the USSR and hence there is no figure for them here.

Future Economic Migration Within Eastern Europe

Urbanization could increase if existing restrictions to move into the major cities are removed. For many years the living conditions, including medical care, education, ecology, the housing and labor markets, were much better in the large cities, especially in Moscow.

To become a Muscovite in 1991 one had to:

1. Be born in Moscow (the fertility level is low, 1.6 children per woman)
2. Marry someone living in Moscow (30,000-50,000 in-migrants per year, often fictive marriages in spite of special rules to avoid this)
3. Excel in certain professions (a small number of actors, engineers, scientists, etc., are allowed to move to Moscow every year)
4. Be a temporary worker in an industry with a shortage of workers or where Muscovites do not want to work. This has been the most common way to enter the capital (according to one source, around 150,000 succeed every year to receive permanent residence after several years as a temporary worker).

If free mobility would be introduced, large flows of in-migrants to Moscow could be the result. Also St. Petersburg (former Leningrad), capitals of other states and some more attractive cities today have the same restrictions and could, with new rules, attract large numbers from rural areas and from smaller cities and towns.

Urbanization will continue. Today every third urbanite lives in a small city with less than 50,000 inhabitants. During the last decades, a little less than one million (net) migrants

per year in the whole union moved to cities. A little less than 800,000 moved to European cities. During 1989 the process slowed down by 15-20 percent.

During the transition from a command economy to a market economy, some of the living conditions, like access to food, could be more complicated in large cities and thus, together with present restrictions on immigration, moderate the urbanization process. In the longer time perspective, the proportion of the population living in large cities will probably increase, as has happened earlier in the history of Western Europe.

East-West Migration

The title of this paper uses the word "poverty" to indicate the difference in living standard between Eastern and Western Europe. In a global perspective, contemporary Eastern Europe is, of course, a rich part of the world with a comparatively well-educated population and an especially great production potential consisting of both human and natural resources (Alton et al. 1984).

If we try to make some simple calculations of how Eastern Europe can improve the present standard of living, it is easy to see that very little can happen during the coming decades, even if a heavy investment program is implemented.

Let us for example make some assumptions about the production system and standard of living in a typical eastern and western region. To make the model simple and easy to understand, we measure everything per capita and disregard labor. Everybody is thus assumed to have the same know-how, energy to work, etc. We also say that the same technology is available in the west and the east. More realistic assumptions would probably favor economic growth in the west. The economies are closed in order to simplify the model. We also assume that the benefits of "capital", which here could include clean air and social infrastructure, have a direct impact on the standard of living. In most models this impact is measured through consumption, but here we will emphasize capital and thus choose this formulation. The following simple expressions will be used:

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{C} &= I - R \\ I &= Q - D \\ R &= rC \\ Q &= qC^a \\ D &= dQ \\ S &= s_1 + s_2 D^b + s_3 C\end{aligned}$$

where

C = Capital stock

$\dot{C} = \frac{\delta C}{\delta t} \Delta t$ = change in C over Δt

I = Investments

R = Depreciation

Q = Production

D = Private and public consumption

S = Standard of living

If the value of the capital stock would be estimated at \$37,500 per person in Eastern Europe and four times as much (\$150,000) in Western Europe, if r is 3.5% per year, if α is 68%, if b is 0.5, if k is 80, if s_1 , the basic standard for all individuals through their own work and pleasure outside the production system, is estimated at \$5,000 per year in 1990, if s_2 is 1% and s_3 is 5% per year, then the standard of living would develop according to Table 8 and Figure 8.


Table 8. Assumptions about the production system and standard of living in a typical Eastern and Western European region.

Year	Eastern European Region			Western European Region		
	Standard of living	Value of "Capital"	Production	Standard of living	Value of "Capital"	Production
	\$/cap/year	\$/cap	\$/cap/year	\$/cap/year	\$/cap	\$/cap/year
1992	8,800	44,900	16,200	15,600	159,300	31,500
2000	10,800	78,000	21,700	17,700	195,900	35,000
2010	13,600	123,600	27,600	20,200	239,300	38,800

This formulation of the changes in standard of living is not based on careful estimations of the variables and is therefore not scientific. We have also used a simplified version of a Cobb-Douglas production function instead of more sophisticated growth models. The idea is however not to make a good model, but to make transparent assumptions on some common-sense ideas of economies. We have tried several alternative⁹ (but less transparent) versions of the model and several alternative assumptions of the variable. The alternatives usually modelled larger differences between east and west than the presented model. The important conclusion is that all formulations had the same message: Even with large investments in social infrastructure (including education in e.g.

⁹It is easy for any social scientist to use software for dynamic modelling, like STELLA or itthink, and test other parameters. The increase in the production system in the USA between 1929 and 1982, due to capital and knowledge/technical development but not to labor, was around 1.5 percent per year, the same growth as in Northern and Western Europe in our example (Denison 1978, 1985; Denison and Poullier 1967). The scenario for Eastern Europe shows a higher growth.

Growth without Transfer



Growth with Transfer




Figure 8. Two scenarios for Eastern Europe and Northern/Western Europe during 100 years. Above, according to assumptions in the text with no transfer of capital or labor. Below, the same assumptions but one percent of the production value in Northern and Western Europe is transferred every year to Eastern Europe as development aid.

accounting and marketing), in physical infrastructure and in technology, it is impossible to reach the western level of standard of living during the coming decades.¹⁰

Transfer of capital from Western to Eastern Europe will, of course, help to develop the standard but not to an extent that will be noticeable during a short time like one or two decades. If countries in Western and Northern Europe would send one percent of their GNP per year, which they have promised but not done, to less developed countries, and these resources would be added to the performance of the production system in Eastern Europe, then the standard of living in Eastern Europe in our model would still be around 44 percent higher in the west in 2010 instead of 49%.

Capital streams are already existing. In late 1991, the Soviet Union owed Western creditors nearly 70 billion dollars¹¹ which is around \$250 per capita. If this money is invested in infrastructure, etc., for future production, this will of course help the economy in Eastern Europe but it will take a long time before the progress will be visible. The amount is less than the "one-percent" transferred yearly as a gift from Northern and Western Europe in our scenario.

If we would believe in theory, then the imbalance between capital and labor in the west (in our example Northern and Western Europe) compared with Eastern Europe could be corrected by a much larger transfer of capital eastward or a transfer of labor westward. If the difference in capital per labor ratio between east and west disappeared and if the figures in our model were accurate, then the transfer of labor (with families) westward should be in the order of five million persons per year during the coming two decades. The number of emigrants from Eastern Europe would then be ten times as high as the present figures. These figures are, of course, hypothetical. In reality these flows would not be accepted (Bovenkerk et al. 1990, 1991; Brubaker 1989, 1990; Janoski 1990). For example, the amount of social engineering necessary to avoid conflicts between immigrants and others does not exist. This is why the iron curtain has now been replaced by a welfare curtain, preventing large migration streams westwards.

East-West "Commuting"

For most citizens, it is not possible to migrate permanently from Eastern Europe. It is not easy to get permission to leave or to be accepted in another country as an immigrant. There is, however, another possibility to leave the country: by private invitation from a person outside of the union. This method has been allowed since 1987 and practiced since 1988. New laws allowing people to leave without invitation are expected as of 1993.

During such a visit to the West, it must be very tempting to work legally or illegally some hours, a week, a month or longer. The international value of the ruble is so low that any

¹⁰In reality there is a danger, which is true for all countries, that people want to consume more and invest less, which would lead to a much poorer future than in our scenarios.

¹¹According to Viktor Gerashchenko, President of the Soviet Central Bank, AP Reuters, 25 September 1991.

income in foreign currency is extremely valuable. If, for example, a Russian professor gave a two-hour lecture in Sweden in 1991, he or she could change this income (US\$ 150) into as many rubles as a yearly income in Moscow. If a visitor to Vienna works hard cleaning windows during one week, this will correspond to a yearly income in Eastern Europe. The official exchange rate has been changing every third or fourth month on average during the last three years and it will probably change many times in the coming years. But the basic large difference in salaries will continue to exist for at least one generation.

The ratio between emigrants and short-term labor, including students and researchers with temporary grants, visiting other countries is estimated at one to five. This means that around 2.5 million visitors to the West every year are working on a short-term basis. This figure will probably increase in the future. When more people in the East get information about the advantages of a short work period in a rich country, they will find a way to use these opportunities. Also many actors like households, firms, hospitals, research centers, etc., would like to employ cheap temporary labor. Each year more information is spread on how to overcome the existing restrictions on mobility.

We could learn from history that temporary migration, like the Russian-German illegal and legal seasonal migration in the old Empire one century ago, will develop when the advantage for all involved is substantial. History also shows that organizations will develop "travel agencies" to help an employer in a rich country find employees from poor countries, as was the case during the migration from Europe to North America one century ago or the present "temporary" migration from Asia to Arab countries. Extensive East-West "commuting" is thus a very probable alternative to large permanent migration from Eastern Europe.

4. CONCLUSION

The geopolitical changes in the former USSR are in a flux and as we write this paper, the number of nations emerging from the former union is still unclear. Two things are however clear. First, there is a large gap between the former union, here labeled Eastern Europe, and the rest of Europe. Under market conditions, there is a huge temptation for capital to move eastwards, where the salaries are low, and for labor to go west, where the salaries are high. Second, ethnic tension among a large number of nationalities is today shown openly, and conditions close to civil war are apparent in several regions. Both of these conditions give rise to migratory flows. The potential strength of these flows is tremendous.

The ethnic migration of Jews, Germans, Greeks, and Armenians will probably continue, partly because of ethnic reasons but also because of economic reasons. The potential number of other migrants from Eastern Europe would be quite large--many millions per year--if economic conditions determined migration. In total the economy of Europe would be better off if around half of the population in Eastern Europe were welcomed in other European countries. This figure is of course very superficial. It has nothing to do with the real world. Large migration flows would cause many problems like braindrain in the East and social unrest in the West. But a reasonable yearly flow of

people westward and increased economic help going eastward will increase economic growth in Europe as a whole. The present welfare gap between east and west will exist for one or two decades also with these flows.

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	Orthodox	Catholic	Protestant	Jew
Lithuania	17	33	2	44
Latvia	12	12	60	16
Estonia	17	2	79	2

	Year of Census
Lithuania	29 1934
Latvia	25 1938
Estonia	12 1935

[illegible]

Table A4. Changes in numbers of Russians and Ukrainians in the former USSR European Republics (in 1000s).

	1959	1979	1989
Russians			
SSSR	114,114	137,397	145,155
Russia	97,864	113,522	119,866
Byelorussia	659	1,134	1,342
Estonia	240	409	475
Moldavia	293	506	562
Latvia	556	821	906
Ukraine	7,091	10,472	11,356
Lithuania	231	303	344
Armenia	56	70	52
Georgia	408	372	341
Azerbaijan	501	475	392
Ukrainians			
SSSR	37,253	42,347	44,186
Ukraine	32,158	36,489	37,419
Latvia	29	67	92
Estonia	16	36	48
Lithuania	18	32	45
Byelorussia	133	231	291
Moldavia	421	294	600
Armenia	6	9	8
Russia	3,359	3,658	4,363
Azerbaijan	26	26	32
Georgia	52	45	52

Table A5. Interethnic marriages of ethnic groups in the former USSR in 1985, percent of total population.

Karelians	83	Moldavians	31
Germans	61	Estonians	23
Jews	50	Russians	21
Byelorussians	44	Lithuanians	16
Tatars	42	Armenians	16
Ukrainians	36	Georgians	12
Latvians	33	Azerbaijanis	9
Ossetians	32		

Table A6. Share of women in interethnic marriages in the former USSR in 1985, percent of total interethnic marriages.

Russians	55	Germans	46
Karelians	54	Moldavians	45
Tatars	51	Ossetians	38
Byelorussians	50	Jews	34
Ukrainians	48	Georgians	34
Latvians	48	Armenians	29
Estonians	47	Azerbaijanis	21
Lithuanians	46		

Table A7. Nationalities in the former USSR speaking "their own" language in 1989, in percentages.

Russians	100	Kurds	81
Azerbaijanis	100	Chuvash	76
Georgians	98	Bashkirs	72
Chechens	98	Byelorussians	71
Lithuanians	98	Bulgarians	68
Estonians	95	Mordvinians	67
Latvians	95	Rumanians	61
Hungarians	94	Koreans	49
Armenians	92	Karelians	48
Moldavians	91	Greeks	44
Turks	91	Finns	34
Tatars	83	Poles	31
Ukrainians	81	Jews	11